Politburo Meeting Highlights Xi's Declining Influence: Xinhua Refers to Xi as "Comrade"

A Scene from a CCP Meeting: The Chairperson on Stage Speaks in a Droning Buzz, Perfect for Helping Me Fall Asleep. (Guang Niu/Getty Images)

[People News] On December 9, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo convened to discuss economic policies, likely setting the tone in advance for the upcoming Central Economic Work Conference. However, Xinhua News Agency's report on the meeting revealed significant changes, including the conspicuous absence of the term "Chinese-style modernization." This phrase has been a signature slogan of the CCP's top leader, Xi Jinping. Its sudden omission from a Politburo meeting suggests new dynamics in the ongoing internal struggles over policy direction and power within the Party. These developments may mark a pivotal turning point in the CCP's factional battles.

Changes in Politburo Meetings Over the Past Year

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo did not hold a meeting in November this year, but ahead of the Central Economic Work Conference, the Politburo needed to set the tone. On December 9, the Politburo held a meeting primarily to discuss economic issues.

On December 8, 2023, a year earlier, the Politburo also convened to deliberate on economic matters. Comparing the two meetings, one major change stands out: the disappearance of the slogan "Chinese-style modernization."

At the Politburo meeting a year ago, while summarizing the economic achievements of 2023, the conclusion stated that "solid steps have been taken in the comprehensive construction of a socialist modernized country."

At the most recent meeting, when summarizing the economic performance for 2024, it merely noted that "the main goals and tasks for economic and social development throughout the year will be successfully completed." The term "socialist modernization" was no longer mentioned.

Looking ahead to 2024 at the 2023 Politburo meeting, it was stated that "Chinese-style modernization will comprehensively advance the great cause of building a strong country and national rejuvenation."

In contrast, the latest Politburo meeting, while looking ahead to 2025, only said, "We will complete the '14th Five-Year Plan' objectives with high quality and lay a solid foundation for a successful start to the '15th Five-Year Plan.'" Again, "Chinese-style modernization" was absent.

The summaries and outlooks for 2024 and 2025 at this year’s Politburo meeting have abandoned the new slogans, including "building a strong country and achieving national rejuvenation." These slogans were created by Wang Huning and others specifically for the Party leader to distinguish himself from his predecessors.

At the CCP’s 20th National Congress in October 2022, Xi Jinping stated in his report that "Chinese-style modernization" is "socialist modernization led by the Communist Party of China." On February 7, 2023, Xi delivered a speech at the Central Party School titled "Correctly Understanding and Vigorously Advancing Chinese-style Modernization." Subsequently, "Chinese-style modernization" permeated CCP propaganda, being framed as the overarching goal and guideline for economic work, and it was heavily promoted domestically and internationally.

The sudden omission of "Chinese-style modernization" at the Politburo meeting is likely a significant sign of escalating internal factional struggles within the CCP. The disappearance of this slogan could also indicate a further decline in the authority and influence of the Party leader.

The CCP Leader's Pre-Set Agenda Fails to Gain Endorsement

Before the Politburo meeting on December 9, the CCP held its customary forum with non-party figures on December 6. This forum nominally solicits opinions from non-party individuals on economic work, but the state media typically does not report what these participants actually say. Instead, the focus remains on the speech by the Party leader.

In this speech, Xi Jinping effectively set the tone for the upcoming Politburo meeting, summarizing the year's economic performance and outlining goals for the next year. These speeches usually align closely with the subsequent Politburo meeting report, although there can be slight differences. State media delays reporting on the non-party forum until after the Politburo meeting, allowing for last-minute adjustments if the meeting's discussions deviate significantly.

This year, the discrepancies between the two meetings are notable, but state media retained some of Xi's remarks from the non-party forum, highlighting growing disagreement among Politburo members with Xi’s views. Xi, however, insisted that his original speech be published in full.

At the December 6 non-party forum, Xi stated, “This year, in the face of a more complex international and domestic environment, the central leadership has withstood pressure, overcome difficulties, and made new solid progress in Chinese-style modernization.”

Three days later, the Politburo meeting report omitted references to a "more complex international and domestic environment," "withstanding pressure," "overcoming difficulties," and "Chinese-style modernization."

The Politburo appears to have rejected Xi's narrative of "withstanding pressure and overcoming difficulties" under his leadership, as well as his slogan of "Chinese-style modernization," effectively signaling a disapproval of Xi's central role.

A year ago, on December 8, 2023, the Politburo meeting report still included phrases like "withstanding external pressures and overcoming internal difficulties," but this year, such language was removed.

At the December 6 forum, Xi also mentioned that “this year, democratic parties, business federations, and non-party individuals have focused on promoting Chinese-style modernization, actively conducting research on ‘developing new productive forces’ and ‘unblocking domestic circulation.’”

The December 9 Politburo meeting, however, omitted the "Chinese-style modernization" slogan and any reference to "unblocking domestic circulation."

Xi’s speech on December 6 also emphasized, “We must remain confident of victory. China’s economic fundamentals are stable, with many advantages, strong resilience, and great potential. The conditions and trends supporting long-term growth have not changed. We must maintain strategic composure and actively shape a favorable external environment… Our development faces many uncertainties and challenges… Each year brings difficulties, but we have always grown stronger through trials and challenges.”

The December 9 Politburo meeting did not mention "confidence in victory," nor did it refer to the economy's "long-term positive outlook." It also avoided discussing the "proactive shaping of a favorable external environment" and omitted references to "many uncertainties and challenges," "challenges faced year after year," or "developing through trials and hardships."

Much of the content from Xi Jinping's pre-set speech was cut from the Politburo meeting report, suggesting that Xi's confidence appears weaker than before.

The Overbearing Tone Is Gone

On December 6, 2023, a year ago, Xi Jinping expressed three hopes at the non-party forum. The first was to "raise political awareness, aligning thoughts and actions with the major decisions and deployments of the Central Committee regarding economic work. This year’s economic performance and achievements fully demonstrate the accuracy and foresight of the Central Committee's judgments and decisions."

On December 6 of this year, Xi again expressed three hopes. The first was to "raise political awareness, assist the Party and government in carrying out economic work... and consciously play the role of a consultative party within the overall framework of national governance."

The contrast between the statements made a year apart is striking. A year ago, the CCP leader affirmed his own "achievements" and deliberately emphasized the "correctness" of his judgments and decisions, demanding that non-party individuals "align" themselves with him. This year, however, the CCP leader did not mention the "correctness" of his decisions or demand alignment from non-party individuals. Instead, he expressed hope that non-party individuals would "assist" and "participate."

This suggests that the CCP leader is aware that his series of judgments and decisions have faced increasing criticism internally, and even accountability. Unable to demand alignment from others, he has been forced to abandon his previously overbearing stance. Notably, he also made a rare distinction between the "Party" and the "government," raising questions about whether control over economic work is shifting back to the State Council.

At last year’s non-party forum, the CCP leader’s second hope was to "strengthen confidence in development and assist in resolving doubts and building consensus."

At this year’s non-party forum, the CCP leader’s second hope was to "leverage the advantage of a wealth of talent and actively contribute ideas and efforts to the Central Committee’s decision-making."

The contrast in the second point is also clear. A year ago, the CCP leader demanded that others echo his views. This year, however, he expressed hope for others to "offer ideas and efforts" and even acknowledged the "advantage of talent" outside the Party. This marks a further lowering of his stance.

Outlook on Changes in Economic Work for the Coming Year

When the CCP Politburo outlines plans for the coming year, it often repeats generic phrases, as no one can predict what may happen. Most Politburo members lack a deep understanding of economics and cannot propose specific strategies. This year’s meeting followed a similar pattern but also showed some notable changes.

At last year’s Politburo meeting, it was stated that to ensure effective economic work for the following year, they must "steadily advance Chinese-style modernization." This year, the Politburo removed this slogan, indicating that Xi Jinping’s economic approach is no longer fully endorsed by Politburo members. However, no new slogan has replaced it yet.

Last year’s Politburo meeting stated that economic work should "organically combine the strategy of expanding domestic demand with deepening supply-side structural reforms, and emphasize stabilizing growth, employment, and prices." This year’s meeting only mentioned "expanding domestic demand," omitting references to "deepening supply-side structural reform" and "stabilizing growth, employment, and prices." Instead, it added a focus on "stabilizing the property and stock markets."

Politburo members likely recognize that "stabilizing growth, employment, and prices" is no longer achievable. As long as factories keep producing, concerns about overcapacity are ignored, and "supply-side structural reform" has been sidelined. The sharp declines in the property and stock markets have now become the CCP’s most pressing sources of anxiety.

This year’s Politburo meeting revised last year’s "proactive fiscal policy" to a "more proactive fiscal policy" and changed "prudent monetary policy" to "moderately loose monetary policy." These adjustments suggest that the Politburo no longer expects consumption from struggling ordinary citizens to drive the economy. Instead, they seem poised to revert to the old path of large-scale infrastructure projects and heavy investments in an effort to "expand domestic demand."

The Disappearance of "Centralized and Unified Leadership"

At last year’s Politburo meeting, it was emphasized to "strengthen the Party's comprehensive leadership over economic work." This year, the wording was reduced to "strengthen the Party's leadership over economic work," omitting the term "comprehensive leadership." This suggests that Xi Jinping’s approach of taking full control over economic matters over the past year has been rejected by Politburo members, and Xi may be losing his dominance in economic policymaking.

Last year’s Politburo meeting also discussed disciplinary inspection work, calling for "strong political oversight to safeguard the authority of the Central Committee and centralized and unified leadership" and strengthening supervision over "top leaders" and leadership teams.

This year’s meeting did not emphasize "the authority of the Central Committee and centralized and unified leadership," nor did it mention the supervision of "top leaders" and leadership teams.

The day before the Politburo meeting, on December 8, Xinhua News Agency previewed the upcoming publication of Xi Jinping’s On Adhering to and Improving the People’s Congress System, set for December 9. Strangely, Xinhua did not refer to Xi as "General Secretary" in its announcement, a deviation from standard propaganda practices. Instead, it referred to him as "Comrade Xi Jinping."

In a brief introduction, Xinhua mentioned "Comrade Xi Jinping" four times and referred to him as "General Secretary" only once, and this was at the very end. In the more detailed "Main Chapters Introduction," "Comrade Xi Jinping" was mentioned 38 times, while "General Secretary Xi Jinping" appeared only once, also at the very end. Identical wording appeared in front-page reports in People’s Daily and PLA Daily and was featured in the CCTV evening news broadcast.

The Politburo meeting’s abandonment of the "Chinese-style modernization" slogan, its failure to fully endorse Xi's pre-set agenda speech at the forum with non-party figures, and the state media's abrupt shift to calling Xi "Comrade" are likely signs of Xi Jinping's further loss of power. These developments point to intensifying factional struggles over policy direction and leadership within Zhongnanhai.

(Dajiyuan)